Encryption¶
Primitives¶
| Use | Algorithm | Parameters |
|---|---|---|
| Key derivation | Argon2id | 128 MB memory, 3 iterations, 4 parallelism |
| Subkey separation | HKDF-SHA256 | Distinct info strings per derived key |
| Vault encryption | XChaCha20-Poly1305 | 192-bit random nonce, fresh on every write of the vault file |
| Public-key wrap (team vaults) | X25519 + XChaCha20-Poly1305 | Vault key wrapped per member |
| Sync payload | XChaCha20-Poly1305 | Same key, distinct nonce per payload |
| Local network channel | Noise_NN_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s | Fresh ephemeral keys per connection |
| Local network proof | HMAC-SHA256 over the Noise handshake hash | Keyed by HKDF-SHA256 of the vault key, or of the pairing group secret |
| Device identity (local network) | Ed25519 | One key per device, kept in the OS keychain; signs the handshake hash |
| Pairing code | HKDF-SHA256 of the handshake hash and both sides' nonces | 6 digits, compared on both screens |
All implementations are pure-Rust crates: argon2, hkdf, chacha20poly1305, x25519-dalek, ed25519-dalek, hmac, snow (Noise). No platform-specific crypto.
Key tree¶
password + account_id
│
├── Argon2id(salt = account_id) ──► master
│ │
│ ├── HKDF("auth") ──► auth_key → server login
│ └── HKDF("enc") ──► enc_key → local accounts: XChaCha20-Poly1305 on the local vault
│ → cloud accounts: KEK, wraps { DEK, X25519 private }
│ DEK → local vault + sync blobs
│
├── (Gist sync)
│ sync passphrase (or PAT) + manifest_salt
│ └── Argon2id → HKDF("enc") ──► gist_enc_key
│
└── (Local network sync)
vault key, or a random 32-byte group secret for paired devices
└── HKDF("voltius-lan-sync-auth-v1") ──► proof key → HMAC over the Noise handshake hash
device key (random Ed25519, one per device, in the OS keychain) → signs the Noise handshake hash
Paired devices without an account share a group: a random vault key and a numbered group secret, handed over inside the Noise channel once both screens confirm the code. Forget on a paired device adds a new group secret and drops the forgotten device from the member list.
What's encrypted vs. metadata¶
| Field | Encrypted? |
|---|---|
| Passwords | ✓ |
| Private keys | ✓ |
| Snippet contents | metadata (plain JSON on disk) |
| Hostnames, ports, usernames | metadata (not encrypted in the local file) |
| Tags, folders | metadata |
| Notes | metadata (plain JSON on disk) |
For sync, everything in the payload is encrypted, metadata included; only a small header (format version, account id, device id, timestamp) is in the clear. The split above is on disk: secrets live in the encrypted secrets.enc, everything else in plain JSON files in the config directory.
Vault file format¶
secrets.enc
├── nonce (24 B, random per write)
└── XChaCha20-Poly1305( JSON { secrets, clocks } ) + tag (16 B)
The whole file is one authenticated message: any corruption makes it unreadable rather than partly readable. Writes go through a staged file and an atomic rename, and an unreadable vault can be set aside as a backup instead of being deleted.
Crate¶
The implementation is open and shared between Tauri (native) and web portal (WASM) via voltius-crypto. The crate holds key derivation and user-key wrapping (lib.rs); vault-file, sync-blob and team-key wrapping code lives in the Tauri backend (src-tauri/src/storage/secrets.rs, src-tauri/src/commands/sync.rs, src-tauri/src/commands/team_crypto.rs).